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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 65 
Accident time: 11:10 Accident Date: 27/06/1996 
Where it occurred: Calomonda Village, 
Huambo 
Country: Angola 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 03/07/1996 
ID original source: MB/V/VDL Name of source: INAROEE 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PPM-2 AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
trees 
Date record created: 23/01/2004 Date  last modified: 23/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: Huambo Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet: 256 
Map name: 1:100 000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 




The demining group issued frontal protection and their drills assumed the deminer would 
kneel or squat while excavating. 
A Board of Inquiry report dated 3rd July 1996 was found on file at the Angola MAC. The 
following summarises its content.  
The site was a former health post "protected by mines laid in 1984". The mines were laid in a 
60º zig-zag pattern at a metre apart. There was high grass, partly burnt off. "Bunches of 
banana trees" obstructed the line of sight. The platoon had been on site for five months and 
had found "about 600 PPM-2 mines. "The same platoon had an accident when a deminer 
prodded on a mine without severe consequences" [see Angola accident on 26th April 1996]. 
The group were using "EBEX" (Ebinger) detectors [type unspecified but likely to be 535s as in 
the accident on 26th April 1996]. Ground conditions meant that is was usually necessary to 
"excavate at a depth between 15 and 20cm" [whether to uncover readings or as routine is 
unclear].  
At around 11:10 the victim got a detector reading and began "prodding and excavating the 
ground using a bayonet" held in his left hand.  A PPM-2 mine detonated. The victim was 
knocked backward "about" two metres by the blast and was lying partly in an uncleared area. 
He stood up quickly, leaving his visor which had been "blown away and broken by the blast". 
The victim received first aid and arrived at the field hospital at 11:20.  
The report stated that the victim was still in the field hospital at the time it was written and that 
he "should be transferred to Luanda". The victim's visor was described as "riddled by 
fragments and broke at the weak points of the articulation on both sides" [the head-frame]. 
His frag-jacket "stopped all projections" limiting injuries to the most exposed parts.  
When interviewed, the deminer and his partner said that he was prodding properly with his 
bayonet "parallel to the ground". No one else was in direct sight of the accident. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the demining group's SOPs were "very probably not in 
question" and asked for a copy. The investigators thought it "likely that the activation of the 
PPM-2 was caused by a rash way of using the bayonet, held like a dagger". This was held as 
being proven by the injuries and by the fact that the victim's other hand was not being used 
"to lead the blade". Although the accident could not be "attributed to a direct and obvious 
negligence" the investigators saw a need for refresher courses and expatriate supervision. 
 
Recommendations  
The investigators recommended that refresher training be carried out at least at the end of 
each task and when encountering "a new or less frequent mine". They said that the demining 
group's staff should carry out frequent checks and elaborate "a scale of sanctions against 
professional mistakes" and suggested that when deminers were trained they should receive a 
book in which to record work history, experience, training and any sanctions imposed.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 92 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Long visor Protection used: Short frontal vest 
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Short frontal vest 
 











See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A medical report dated 3rd July stated that the victim suffered "traumatic amputation of the 
fourth and fifth fingers of the left hand….burn lesions (111º grade) and hurts with loose skin at 
the whole left forearm….traumatic wounds at the superior lip….fracture at the left cuff". He 
received emergency surgery on the day of the accident and had no infection.  
See also Related papers. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because, as the 
investigators concluded, the victim's injuries imply he was prodding dangerously and the error 
was not corrected.  
The victim is presumed to have been squatting to excavate because it was normal practice for 
this demining group to do so and there is no reason to suppose he was not.  
Notice that the victim was wearing this demining group's short vest and suffered shoulder 
injury. The "vest" does not extend upward to the shoulders. The visor used was a 5mm 
polycarbonate full-face visor.  The demining group's description of the failure as "the visor 
splitting and being pushed back" probably refers to the head-frame breaking ("splitting") and 
allowing the face of the visor to be driven back. However, the curvature of that kind of visor 
would not allow the victim's lip to be damaged without his nose being crushed and his chin 
knocked backwards. These injuries were not recorded, so I assume that they did not occur 
and that the victim was wearing the visor in a manner that allowed some of the blast and 
environmental fragments to enter from below. His visor was probably raised. 
The delay in the victim reaching appropriate medical facilities represents a significant failing of 
management to arrange appropriate CASEVAC facilities. 
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Related papers 
An internal demining group "Mine danger area" report added that 500 PPM-2s were known to 
have been laid, and so far 600 had been found. The report stated that they had found 10 
PPM-2s "in poor condition, corroded, some filled with water and earth".   
A further untitled demining group report stated that the accident occurred at 11:05. The victim 
"lost the two extreme fingers of his left hand and the top part of his thumb". He appeared to 
have "extensive lacerations and burns to his left forearm with some blast and fragmentation 
going up his arm….very minor fragmentation wounds to his left shoulder, upper left arm and 
left lower leg… (and)… a minor cut to his upper lip which required stitches as a result of the 
visor splitting and being pushed back". The demining group expressed an intent to improve 
training to ensure no further lapses occur. 
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